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This study examines the growth in total factor productivity (TFP) of 12 Asia-Pacific telecommunica-
tions carriers for the period 1987 through 1990. Carriers are chosen to represent the stages of tele-
communications liberalisation identified by the International Telecommunication Union (1995a). A
model relating TFP growth to output growth, changes in output mix, technology change and market
competition and private ownership is estimated on a unique data set obtained from telecommunications
carrier annual reports. Empirical results show competition, private ownership, technology change and
scale economies improve carrier TFP growth.
 
I . I n t r o d u c t i o n
 
In an emerging global economy, characterised by greater trade liberalisation and increasing
information needs, the telecommunications sector provides a basis for competitive advantage.
The efficient delivery of telecommunication services generates direct benefits through lower
input costs and indirect benefits due to accelerated information diffusion. Until recently, most
Asia-Pacific telecommunications services have been provided by public monopoly. Mandated
supply was typically justified by natural monopoly arguments and often tied to an obligation to
provide universal service. This obligation was commonly interpreted as the promise to supply
basic telephony to customers even if not economically viable to do so.
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 In an environment
of rapid technology change, recent public utility reform has recognised both competition and
privatisation are better able to provide benefits such as operating efficiency and lower prices
(Megginson 
 
et al.
 
 1994, Ramamurti 1996, Boyland and Nicoletti 2000). Accordingly, the open-
ing of telecommunication markets to entry and transfer of telecommunications infrastructure
from public to private ownership became important policy objectives from the mid-1980s.
Several papers use within-country data to study the relationship between telecommunications
sector market structure and productivity. Kwoka (1993) finds economies of scale an important
 
Correspondence: Gary Madden, GPO Box U1987, Perth 6845 Western Australia; tel, 
 
+
 
61 8 9266 4258;
fax, 
 
+
 
61 8 9266 2391; email, maddeng@cbs.curtin.edu.au. Comments by Colin Hargreaves and two anonym-
ous referees are gratefully acknowledged, as is data support from the International Telecommunication
Union, Singapore Telecom and Telstra. The usual disclaimer applies.
 
1
 
By providing access to users who otherwise could not afford services, universal service obligations
(USOs) may increase network value to existing subscribers through a network externality. In this case, the
economic viability of providing service needs to be evaluated on a system-wide basis.
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source of productivity growth in United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) international
PSTS markets. Further, the introduction of competition in the US market and the privatisation
of British Telecom are responsible for efficiency gains. Oum and Zhang (1995) investigate the
behaviour of rate-of-return regulated domestic telecommunication carriers in the US following
the 1984 introduction of competition. They suggest competition improves incumbent tele-
communications carrier allocative efficiency. Gort and Sung (1999) also consider the effect of
competition on the efficiency of the US domestic telephone industry. They find efficiency is
improved faster in competitive markets and telephone company production exhibits constant
returns to scale. Gort and Sung also show that technology change, measured by change in the
capital vintage, contributes to productivity growth and cost reduction.
Received cross-county analysis shows competition and private ownership impact on carrier
performance. Using a panel of 10 OECD Member Country international carriers from 1984 to
1987, Staranczak 
 
et al.
 
 (1994) relate TFP growth to output growth, technology change (share of
mainlines served by digital central offices), competition, private ownership and output mix
(ratio of main lines to telecommunications output to capture any cross-subsidisation of local by
long-distance call prices). Results indicate output growth and privatisation are positively asso-
ciated TFP growth, whilst output-mix is inversely related.
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 Ros (1999) estimates the effect of
privatisation and competition on telecommunications efficiency for 74 countries from 1986 to
1995, and shows that privatisation and competition are positively associated with efficiency.
Boyland and Nicoletti (2000) investigate the effects of entry liberalisation and privatisation on
productivity, prices and quality of service in long-distance and mobile cellular telephony ser-
vices in 23 OECD countries from 1991 to 1997. Controlling for technology and market structure
model estimates show prospective and effective competition improve productivity. Madden and
Savage (2001), employ a Malmquist index to calculate telecommunications TFP growth for 74
countries for 1991 through 1995. They estimate a model relating TFP growth to output growth,
network digitisation, telecommunications development, output mix, business cycle and market
structure. Model estimates show developing countries may increase their TFP growth through
technology catch-up, and privatisation and competition are conducive to telecommunications
productivity growth.
The Asia-Pacific region experienced rapid growth through the 1980s and 1990s in network
expansion and traffic flows. Average annual growth in main telephone lines from 1984 through
1994 of 7.8%, compares well to the 3.3% per annum (p.a.) of OECD Member Countries (ITU
1995a). Low-income Asia-Pacific countries, such as Indonesia and Thailand, have made sub-
stantial infrastructure investment sustaining growth rates in main lines of 15% p.a. for the
period. The growth of intra–Asia-Pacific PSTS capacity and traffic suggest telecommunications
is important to regional business expansion and trade links. In particular, between 1992 and
1994, international telephone circuits increased 64% in China, 69% in Thailand and 52% in
Singapore.
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 Further, outgoing Australia–Asia-Pacific telephone traffic increased from 131.6
million minutes in 1987 to 274.4 million minutes in 1992 (an average increase of 16% p.a.),
and Thailand–Asia-Pacific traffic increased from 22.8 to 104.2 million minutes (an average
increase of 36% p.a.).
Asia-Pacific telecommunication market structure varies from state-owned monopoly to un-
regulated competition. The ITU (1995a) describe Asia-Pacific telecommunications liberalisation
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Staranczak 
 
et al.
 
 (1994) suggest the impact of technology change can be neutral as productivity gains are
offset in the short term by capital expenditure required for digitisation.
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International telephone circuits refer to the number of links (voice channel equivalents) with other coun-
tries for establishing telephone communications.
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in three stages. Stage One began in the mid-1980s and was led by the more developed regional
economies. The 1984 divestre of AT&T in the US marks the beginning. Japan followed soon after
with part privatisation of the state-owned carrier, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
(NTT), and introducing competition into long-distance markets in 1985. The Second Wave
commenced in ASEAN countries from the early-1990s with the partial privatisation of Indonesian
state-owned long-distance carrier PT Indosat, Korea Telecom, Singapore Telecom and Telecom
Malaysia. More recently, Stage Three began in the less developed regional countries of
PR China, India, Pakistan and Vietnam. For example, in 1993, the regulatory and operating
arms of the Chinese Ministry of Posts were separated and China UNICOM contracted to build
a competitor long-distance telephone network (ITU 1995a, Ure 1996). There is also increased
competition in the early-liberalised exchange and cellular markets. For instance, both Hong
Kong and Australia have moved toward open competition in domestic fixed-line telephone
service, while Australia, Korea (Rep.), New Zealand and the US have issued additional cellular
licenses.
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This study examines TFP growth in 12 Asia-Pacific telecommunication carriers during 1987
to 1990. Carriers are chosen to represent particular stages of telecommunications liberalisa-
tion as identified by the ITU (1995a). An econometric model is developed from neoclassical
production theory to relate TFP growth to output growth, technology change, output mix, and
competition and ownership (public or private). Model estimates are used to see whether
market structure is associated with productivity increase during Stage One of Asia-Pacific tele-
communications liberalisation. By examining Stage One liberalisation, empirical findings can
provide a basis to suggest the extent of potential benefits from pursuing regional deregulation
in telecommunications and public utility markets.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II describes the structure of Asia-Pacific tele-
communications markets and provides an overview of their performance. In Section III an
econometric model is derived to explain TFP growth by its determinants. Estimation results
are reported and discussed in Section IV, while conclusions are provided in Section V.
 
I I . A s i a - Pac i fi c  Te l e c o m m u n i c at i o n  M a r k e t  I n d i c at o r s
 
Table I lists dominant national telecommunications carrier characteristics for 12 Asia-Pacific
countries. Data are obtained from the ITU (1995a, 1995b) and carrier annual reports. All coun-
tries are APEC Members, while Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the US are also
OECD Member Countries. Country carriers are sole or dominant providers of local exchange
and long-distance services. Market structure is described by carrier ownership and market com-
petition. A market is described competitive when more than a single carrier is authorised to
operate in the domestic local exchange and long-distance public switched telephone market.
Four sampled countries allow competition during 1987 through 1990, viz., Japan, Korea (Rep.),
New Zealand and the US. Ownership is classified 100% public, 100% private or partial private
ownership. At 1990, five carriers are public, five private and two partial private in ownership.
Two of four carriers operating in competitive markets, NZ Telecom and AT&T, are 100% pri-
vately owned.
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A telecommunications trade liberalisation agreement reached at the WTO in February 1997 sees tradi-
tional monopoly and closed markets replaced by markets open to foreign ownership, competition and
privatisation.
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Main telephone lines provide a measure of telecommunications infrastructure investment and
network size. Sample data show main lines range from just below one million for Singapore
Telecom to 15 million for KTA. ITU (1995a) data indicate clear disparities between rural and
urban telecommunications infrastructure investment. 71% of the developing Asia-Pacific national
populations reside in rural areas but only 17% of telephone networks cover these areas. Teledensity
(main lines per 100 persons) is an ITU preferred measure of network roll out and range from 2
(TOT and PLDT) to 54 (AT&T). NTT’s teledensity is 40 but still lags behind that of HK Telecom,
the largest carrier of the Dragon economies, Hong Kong, Korea (Rep.), Singapore and Taiwan.
 
5
 
Based on current growth rates, teledensity among high-income Dragon carriers is projected
to surpass that of Asia-Pacific OECD Member Country carriers by the early-21st century (ITU
1995a). While OECD countries have taken from 10 to 15 years to achieve teledensity of 10 to
30, Dragon carriers have attained this penetration in 6 to 10 years. Carriers from Thailand and
Malaysia are set to achieve this penetration more quickly.
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The high level of teledensity in Hong Kong is due to its population density.
Table I Asia-Pacific telecommunication carriers at 1990
Country and Dominant Carrier Competition Ownership
Main Lines
(000s)
Teledensity 
(%)
Digitisation 
(%)
Australia 
Telecom Australia
No Public 7,787 46 20
Canada 
Bell Canada
No Private 15,296 51 57
Hong Kong 
HK Telecom
No Private 2,305 48 60
Japan 
NTT
Yes 
(1985)
Partial 
(35%)
52,000 40 33
Korea (Rep.) 
Korea Telecom Authority (KTA)
Yes 
(1990)
Public 15,293 31 19
Malaysia 
Telekom Malaysia (TM)
No Partial 
(25%)
1,817 10 78
New Zealand 
NZ Telecom
Yes 
(1990)
Private 1,473 43 92
Philippines 
Philippines Long Distance 
Telephone Company (PLDT)
No Private 1,047 2 4
Singapore 
Singapore Telecom
No Public 982 38 49
Taiwan 
Directorate General of 
Telecommunications (DGT)
No Public 7,874 40 2
Thailand 
Telephone Organisation of 
Thailand (TOT)
No Public 1,325 2 57
United States 
AT&T
Yes 
(1984)
Private 100,062 54 47
Note: Parentheses in the competition column show when competition was introduced. Parentheses in the
ownership column show the private ownership share.
Source: ITU (1995a, 1995b), Carrier annual reports and FCC (1987–1990).
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Digitisation refers to the number of main lines connected to digital switches and provides an
indicator of network sophistication. Switches connect telephone subscribers by selecting paths
(circuits) through the network. Digital switching lower costs, increase transmission speed and
quality, and allow transmission of a greater range of voice grade and data services than ana-
logue systems. The shift to digital technology facilitates the development of network capacity
and improves the quality and efficiency of service provision. In Hong Kong and Malaysia
exchange line digitisation is over 60%, while in Australia, despite the high level of teledensity,
only 20% of local lines are digitised. In 1990, New Zealand has the highest level of local digitisa-
tion (92%), with Wellington among first cities globally to be completely digitised.
Table II reports TFP growth summary statistics for 1987 through 1990. TFP estimates are
calculated by using the Tornqvist approximation of the Divisia index to aggregate outputs and
inputs.
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 Average TFP growth for sampled carriers is 1.65% p.a. When OECD Member carriers
are excluded this average rises to 2.53%. TOT achieved above the average TFP growth (7.12%),
while TM, NZ Telecom and AT&T registered negative average growth for the period. The
productivity decline for AT&T was greatest from 1988 through 1990. This outcome reflects
substantial costs incurred in converting existing long-distance network to full digitisation. All
carriers with the exception of Bell Canada, Hong Kong Telecom, DGT and TOT experienced at
least a year of negative TFP growth.
 
I I I . E c o n o m e t r i c  M o d e l  a n d  Data
 
Recent empirical work on telecommunications TFP is based on Fuss and Waverman (1977).
They describe carrier production technology by a cost function
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Calculations, data source and transformations are provided in the Appendix.
Table II TFP growth 1987 to 1990
Carrier 1987 1988 1989 1990 Mean Std. Dev.
Telecom Australia 2.14 - 0.98 - 0.02 7.69 2.21 3.88
Bell Canada 1.62 3.24 2.81 2.08 2.44 0.73
HK Telecom 5.50 8.49 3.46 4.40 5.46 2.18
NTT - 0.63 - 0.38 3.18 2.39 1.14 1.93
KTA 1.91 - 1.89 1.74 1.83 0.90 1.86
TM 0.78 5.60 - 4.11 - 2.86 - 0.15 4.36
NZ Telecom - 3.34 - 0.72 - 0.07 0.99 - 0.79 1.84
PLDT 4.27 - 0.97 0.06 6.12 2.37 3.37
Singapore Telecom 1.12 3.33 - 0.54 - 1.47 0.61 2.11
DGT 1.20 1.00 0.69 2.58 1.37 0.84
TOT 6.23 4.54 7.42 10.29 7.12 2.42
AT&T - 1.29 - 7.11 - 8.78 5.82 - 2.84 6.61
Mean 1.63 1.18 0.49 3.32 1.65 –
Std. Dev. 2.75 4.12 4.04 3.75 2.65 –
Mean (excl. OECD) 3.00 2.87 1.25 2.98 2.53 –
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t
 
 is a time trend to proxy improvement in technology. Totally differentiating (1) with respect to
time for outputs 
 
q
 
j
 
 and input prices 
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t
 
, respectively, gives
. (2)
Dividing (2) by 
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 and applying Shephard’s lemma provides
, (3)
where  is the derived carrier demand for input 
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. Substitution of ,
, ,  and  into (3) and rearranging gives
, (4)
that shows the proportionate shift in the cost function equals the change in costs, less the sum
of cost elasticity (equal to the reciprocal scale elasticity) weighted 
 
j
 
 output changes, less the
sum of weighted input price changes.
Totally differentiating the cost, , with respect to time and substituting into (4)
gives an expression for technological change
. (5)
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Equation (6) decomposes TFP growth into scale economies (
 
Q
 
) and technology change (
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When no economies of scale are present 
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 1 and TFP growth is solely attributable to the
effects of technological change, measured by shifts in the cost function through time. To make
the model suitable for estimation an intercept and error term are added to (6) such that
TFPit = a 0 + a 1Q + a 2Tit + uit (7)
for all i = 1, . . . , n and t = 1, . . . , T. The a ’s are parameters to be estimated,  and
uit is an error term. Equation (7) is further augmented to allow TFP growth to vary with inde-
pendent country factors, such as output mix (MIX ), competition (COMP) and privatisation
(PRIV ), and the initial level of TFP at 1986 (PROD86), viz.,
TFPit = d 0 + d 1Qit + d 2Tit + d 3MIXit + d 4COMPit + d 5PRIVit + eit (8)
where the d ’s are parameters to be estimated and eit is a white noise error term.
Output growth Q is defined as the log difference of aggregate telecommunications output,
where total telecommunications output is measured by minutes of local exchange, long-distance
and outgoing international traffic. Whilst, the telecommunications sector is characterised by
relatively high capital intensity, recent empirical analyses do not demonstrate conclusively that
scale economies exist (Productivity Commission 1997). Since d 1 is one minus the respective
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cost elasticities, 0 < d 1 < 1 imply economies of scale. Technology change T is the log change of
the telecommunications technology index and the proxy for technology change is based on a
network-switching indicator of most recent vintage. Following Oum and Zhang (1995), the
index is defined annually as the log of one plus the percentage of main lines served by digital
switches. d 2 is expected positive and so imply increased productivity growth.
Telecommunications pricing by state-owned (or regulated) carriers typically focuses on
achieving USOs rather than efficient pricing. A cost premium is often charged for long-distance
and IMTS services, whilst local-exchange services are charged below cost. Denny et al. (1981)
show that such cross-subsidisation can influence the measurement of productivity change. In
particular, higher growth rates for subsidised services relative to total service can lead to cost
inefficiency and lower productivity gains. Output mix (MIX ), the log change in domestic output
divided by the log change in aggregate output, captures cross-country output mix differences
and accounts for cross-subsidisation effects (log per cent change in national mainlines is a
proxy for local call output growth). d 3 is expected negative.
COMP, PRIV, and (COMP · PRIV) are intended to isolate market structure impacts on carrier
productivity. COMP is a dummy variable that equals one when there is more than a sole author-
ised carrier operating in local-exchange and long-distance PSTS markets at t, and zero other-
wise. Competing hypotheses about the relationship between competition and productivity
growth suggest no a priori sign expectation for d 4.
7 Received empirical evidence, however,
reveal a positive relationship between telecommunication productivity growth and competition
(Kwoka 1993, Oum and Zhang 1995, Gort and Sung 1999, Ros 1999, Boyland and Nicoletti
2000, Madden and Savage 2001). Following Madden and Savage (2000, 2001), PRIV is a pri-
vatisation index defined by one plus the private ownership share of the dominant carrier. To the
extent that private sector ownership provides an incentive for more efficient production, innova-
tion and improved customer service a positive sign for d 5 is expected (Kwoka 1993, Megginson
et al. 1994, Wellenius and Stern 1994, Staranczak et al. 1994, Ramamurti 1996, Ros 1999,
Madden and Savage 2001).8 The interaction term COMP · PRIV is included to isolate the joint
impact of competition and privatisation on TFP growth. d 6 has no expected sign.
9 The initial
level of telecommunications productivity (PROD86) is included as an explanatory variable in
(8) to allow investigation of convergence in Asia-Pacific telecommunications. TFP growth is
calculated by using the Divisia index to aggregate outputs and inputs, with capital expense
residually derived from total revenue and costs. Whilst this approach overcomes data limita-
tions, it calculates TFP growth by implicitly normalising TFP levels around a common base
year (1987) for all countries. Hence, it is not possible to directly calculate initial TFP levels in
7 Schumpeter (1942) argues monopoly power (or market concentration) and large firm size drive technology
advance and productivity growth. By contrast, perfect competition suggests firms must exhibit cost-
minimising behaviour and instantly respond to technical advance to survive. Further, North (1990), Levy
and Spiller (1996) and Ros (1999) argue competition does not allow pursuit of objectives other than profit-
maximisation. Competition also enables price and profit to signal information about enterprise costs and
efficiency. Such information assist principals in determining input levels needed to compete effectively.
8 Ownership may also affect firm behaviour through incentive structures (North 1990, Levy and Spiller
1996, Ros 1999). Privatisation implicitly assumes the switch from public to private ownership leads to
more precise objectives and creates an improved monitoring of management. With public ownership non-
commercial objectives are pursued and less effort is employed in the pursuit of efficiently (Ramamurti
1996). By contrast, the objective of private ownership is to achieve a higher level of management super-
vision and more commercial and timely financial decisions.
9 The degree and timing of regulatory change is probably influenced by lagged industry performance,
however, as the time from an initial government decision and to subsequent market structure changes is
reasonably long it is unlikely to affect the exogeneity of COMP and PRIV to TFP growth for the short
time series employed in this study (see Boyland and Nicoletti 2000, Kridel et al. 1996).
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1986 in an absolute sense. However, recent evidence suggests possibilities for technological
catch-up and substantial productivity growth in developing economies with low teledensity levels
(Melody 1997, Intven and Tetrault 2000, Madden and Savage 2001). Accordingly, the level of
teledensity at 1986 represents a suitable proxy for PROD86. By analogy with standard growth
models, PROD86 is expected to enter (8) with a negative sign ( d 7 < 0), implying convergence.
Annual data for 12 Asia-Pacific telecommunication carriers for 1987 through 1990 are used to
construct variables to estimate (8). Means, standard deviations and correlations of variables
contained in (8) are reported in Table III.
I V. E m p i r i c a l  R e s u lt s
A fixed-effect model with country intercepts is used to estimate (8) on panel data described
in Table III. The model is also estimated on sub-sets of these data. In particular, the sample
excluding Hong Kong and the sample excluding Canada and the US.10 Generalised least squares
(GLS) estimates, with appropriate corrections for group-wise heteroskedasticity and within
group first-order autocorrelation, are presented in Table IV. All regression equations are well
specified and report Buse R2’s of 0.56 to 0.68. Model results appear robust across regressions
model parameter estimates qualitatively similar.
The coefficient for Q is positive (implying e CQ < 1). For the full sample, a per cent increase in
output leads to 0.086% increase in TFP, indicating increasing returns (or declining unit costs)
exist for this sample of Asia-Pacific carriers. T has an estimated positive coefficient in (i) and
(iii). This finding suggests Asia-Pacific carriers can achieve immediate productivity benefits
from their investment in digital technology. Estimated coefficients for PRIV and COMP are
positive and suggest privatisation and competition have contributed to productivity growth in
Stage One of Asia-Pacific liberalisation. Privatisation appears to have the stronger impact
across regressions. This is not surprising as private ownership may, in the short run, impose a
stricter operational discipline on telecommunications carrier management than the introduction
of competition (Ramamurti 1996). It is worth noting that several received studies of the impact
of telecommunications market performance and structure fail to identify a relationship between
competition and productivity. In particular, Staranczak et al. (1994) argues that their sample
period is too short to capture the dynamic gains of competition. Here it is suggested that carrier
10 Hong Kong is a somewhat atypical jurisdiction as it was controlled by the UK during the sample period,
and its carrier HK Telecom has always been privately owned. Both the US and Canada are also atypical
due to their geographic location, viz-a-viz, the rest of the sample and their private ownership structure.
Table III Summary statistics 1987 to 1990
Variable Mean St. Dev. TFP Growth Correlations
TFP growth TFP 0.016 0.037 1.000
Output growth Q 0.090 0.067 0.187
Digitisation T 0.066 0.083 0.215
Output mix MIX - 0.269 4.974 0.069
Privatisation PRIV 1.387 0.469 0.012
Competition COMP 0.250 0.438 - 0.255
Interaction PRIV · COMP 0.124 0.250 - 0.290
Initial teledensity 1986 PROD86 28.008 17.051 - 0.276
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TFP performance is better in Asia-Pacific markets that have moved away from monopoly supply.
While the sign of the interaction variable is negative, an F-test indicates the combined impact
of competition and privatisation is different from zero in (i) through (iii). This implies that pri-
vatisation or competition, and both privatisation and competition together, improve TFP. Finally,
d 7 < 0 indicates convergence of TFP levels through time. That is, low telecommunications pro-
ductivity countries can improve their productivity growth through technological catch-up.
V. C o n c l u s i o n s
This study examines TFP growth for 12 Asia-Pacific telecommunications carriers during
Stage One regional liberalisation. Empirical results show a relationship between telecom-
munications output and TFP growth. An important component of output growth is international
telephone traffic, which increased 20% annually since the mid-1980s. Such traffic flows are
influenced by trade and inter-regional investment. The positive relationship between technology
change and TFP growth bodes well for carriers and consumers during the Second Stage and
Third Stage of liberalisation. In particular, investment in digital technology has produced pro-
ductivity gains that will ultimately flow through to lower call prices and improved service qual-
ity. Finally, the positive effect of private ownership and competition on TFP growth across
regressions lends support to the ongoing reform of Asia-Pacific telecommunications markets.
The positive relationship between competition and TFP growth is encouraging since the intro-
duction of competition is often accompanied by regulation limiting carrier behaviour. Such
restrictions are usually politically motivated and intended to preserve cross subsidy contained
within rate structures (Ramamurti 1996).
Table IV TFP equation estimation results
Dependent Variable: 
TFP Growth TFP (i) Full Sample
(ii) Sub Sample with 
Hong Kong Omitted
(iii) Sub Sample
with Canada and 
the US Omitted
Output growth Q 0.0859a 
(2.629)
0.0674b 
(1.788)
0.0969a 
(2.501)
Digitisation T 0.0760b 
(1.821)
0.0606 
(1.404)
0.0724b 
(1.771)
Output mix MIX 0.0006 
(0.486)
0.0006 
(0.596)
0.0011 
(0.902)
Privatisation PRIV 0.0356a 
(4.449)
0.0318a 
(3.415)
0.0350a 
(2.907)
Competition COMP 0.0767a 
(2.059)
0.0682b 
(1.773)
0.0759b 
(1.725)
Interaction PRIV · COMP - 0.0596 
( - 2.339)a
- 0.0531 
( - 2.003)a
- 0.0587 
( - 1.932)a
Initial teledensity 1986 PROD86 - 0.0008a 
( - 2.852)
- 0.0008a 
( - 2.548)
- 0.0009a 
( - 2.198)
Constant - 0.0151b 
( - 1.902)
- 0.0103 
( - 1.034)
- 0.013 
( - 0.783)
N · T 48 44 40
Buse R2 0.68 0.57 0.56
F 2.98a 2.47a 2.52a
Note: adenotes significant at the 5% level; bdenotes significant at the 10% level; asymptotic t-ratio in
parentheses; the F-test statistic examines the hypothesis d 4 + d 5 + d 6 = 0.
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A p p e n d i x : Data  S o u r c e s  a n d  T f p  Ca l c u l at i o n
Telecommunications carrier data are for sole or dominant providers for sampled APEC Member
Country carriers. Carrier data used in TFP calculations are drawn from carrier annual reports.
Reports are obtained via direct correspondence. As annual reports could not be obtained
for the dominant carriers of Indonesia and PR China they are not included. Further, Brunei,
Chile, Mexico and Papua New Guinea carrier data are not included in the sample as their
nations are not APEC Member Countries in the sample period. In calculating TFP consistent
across countries is difficult due to alternative cost definitions and accounting standards used by
carriers. For example, sometimes company information is reported while for others information
is provided in consolidated form. Company information is used where possible. Consolidated
reports are relied on for Telecom Australia, Telecom New Zealand, Hong Kong Telecom and
NTT. TFP calculations are based on either carrier output or input data depending on the format
of annual reports. Further, financial information detailed in the annual reports is occasionally
disaggregated, however, such data are often reported in an irregular manner.
(i) Output data
Total operating revenue (TOR) does not include interest income, disposals, capital gains/
losses and dividends, and is typically comprised of international and domestic traffic revenue,
leased circuit and data communication facility and sales of terminal equipment. In some coun-
tries postal service revenue is also included as a component of TOR.
Output price is used to deflate TOR into constant currency. Output price is based on national
telecommunications price indexes (TPI) for a service basket (1987 = 100) where available. TPI
data are available for Australia, Japan, Taiwan and the US. For the remainder domestic con-
sumer price index (CPI) data are employed (World Bank 1994).
Output is revenue deflated by TPI or CPI.
(ii) Input data
Labour and material expense includes salary and wages, pension and benefit payments,
labour-related taxes, services obtained from outside suppliers, materials, cost of installation and
maintenance of customer services, and rent of premises.
Labour and material price is used to deflate combined labour and material expense. CPI data
are used as carrier price deflators for labour and materials are not available (1987 = 100).
Labour and materials are CPI deflated combined labour and material expense.
Capital expense is the difference between TOR and combined labour and material expense.
This treatment assumes total revenue equals cost, and revenue not spent on labour and materials
is expended on capital purchases. Here capital expense includes interest, depreciation, income
taxes and takes into consideration plant under construction.
Capital price is used to deflate capital expense. The average net book value of property, plant
and equipment is calculated to obtain a capital investment trend. An index is constructed based
on this trend with respect to the base year (1987 = 100).
Capital is the capital expense deflated by capital price.
(iii) TFP calculations
TFP growth is calculated by using the Tornqvist approximation to the Divisia index to aggreg-
ate outputs and inputs. The time change in TFP is
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TFP = ln Q -  ln Z (A1)
where Q is aggregate output, Z is aggregate input, and the dot represents growth rates. The
change in aggregate output and aggregate input, respectively, are
(A2)
and
(A3)
where rjt is the revenue share of output j at time t and sit is the expense share of input i at time t.
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